The evidence for objective morality is hidden in plain speech.
Skeptics often claim that morality is nothing more than preference—shaped by empathy, culture, or personal goals. But if morality is just preference, then concepts like “justice” or “fairness” have no more authority than a taste in musical styles. They would be nothing more than what we like.
Yet this is not how we actually use moral language. When someone calls something “unjust,” they don’t just mean “I don’t prefer it.” They mean “it ought not be done.” As I argued previously, we instinctively recognize that a child ought not be harmed for self-gratification. Notice how naturally that word ought arises.
And that’s the problem for the skeptic. The very moment we use moral terms like unjust or ought, we treat morality as something real and binding—something that goes beyond mere personal taste. In theory, one can insist morality is subjective, but in practice, everyone speaks and lives as if moral truths are objective.
That inconsistency is itself the evidence that objective morality is inescapable.
Related posts:
If Morality is Real, So is its Source (part 1)
The Bedrock and Ground of the “Ought”: Continuing Reflections on Objective Morality (part 3)